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I.     INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization labeled the emerging COVID-19 respiratory 
virus a pandemic.[1] In the months afterwards, states and local governments across the country 
implemented drastic measures restricting the movement of their citizens in an effort to “stop the spread” 
of the novel coronavirus.[2] In most cases, these orders came from state executives, often relying on 
rarely-used emergency powers. 
As restrictions tightened and the pandemic dragged on, frustrated plaintiffs fought back in the courts. 
Some challenged the new restrictions under familiar provisions—usually the First Amendment’s free 
exercise and free speech clauses.[3] Others raised novel claims challenging the legal foundation of 
the restrictions themselves: emergency executive powers provisions. The litigation, though disparate 
and unpredictable, held one thing in common; it provided Americans with a fascinating case study in 
the unique American idiosyncrasy known as “federalism.” The Michigan and Kentucky Supreme Courts 
were perhaps the most dramatic examples. 
On October 2, 2020, Michigan’s highest court rebuked Governor Whitmer’s use of executive power, 
declaring her without power to issue new orders and ruling a central emergency powers statute 
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.[4] Forty-one days later, Kentucky’s Supreme Court 
unanimously endorsed Governor Beshear’s use of his emergency powers, declining to rule the 
underlying statute unconstitutional under the same doctrine and nearly identical constitutional provisions.[5] The two governors’ executive orders were more 
similar than not, and the constitutional limitations and emergency powers statutes nearly identical. The different treatment, however, lies in the unique and 
idiosyncratic development of parallel bodies of law in the two states.
II.   MICHIGAN
Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer was a day ahead of the World Health Organization, first declaring a state of emergency on March 10, 2020. On 
April 1, 2020, she re-declared a “state of emergency” and “state of disaster” under two separate emergency powers statutes: the Emergency Management 
Act of 1976 (EMA), and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 (EPGA),[6] and requested that the legislature extend her order for 70 days.[7] 
a.     Emergency Management Act of 1976
The EMA allows the governor to unilaterally declare a “state of emergency”[8] or “state of disaster”[9] at her sole discretion. The governor can act by 
executive order or proclamation, and the ensuing declared emergency or disaster continues “until the governor finds that the threat or danger has passed,” 
or the emergency otherwise ends.[10]
There is a catch. Both the disaster and emergency provisions contain a strong proviso: all orders or proclamations issued under the EMA may not last for 
longer than 28 days without consent of the legislature. The EMA provides that, “[a]fter 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation 
declaring the state of emergency terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of emergency for a specific number of days is 
approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature.”[11] The “disaster” statute contained in the prior subdivision is in all ways identical, with “disaster” 
simply substituted for “emergency.”[12] This constitutes a significant limitation on the governor’s power to act.
b.    Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945
Born out of the Detroit race riots of 1943, the EPGA is in many ways repetitive of the EMA, but with a different emphasis. In 1943 Governor Harry Kelly was 
faced with an impossible choice during the riots: declare martial law—thereby removing police authority to act—or rely only on standard law enforcement 
tactics and personnel.[13] He sidestepped the catch-22 entirely, opting for an extralegal emergency declaration and the use of State Troops.[14] 
Recognizing the need for emergency powers in situations of sudden violence, the legislature passed the EPGA two years later.[15]
The EPGA differs from the EMA primarily by historical context. While the EMA is a general statute, the EPGA focuses on “times of great public crisis, disaster, 
rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency.”[16] However, the key language allows the governor to act on any “reasonable apprehension of 
immediate danger . . . when public safety is imperiled.”[17] Reasoning that public safety was imperiled by the immediate danger of the COVID-19 
respiratory virus, Governor Whitmer issued EO 2020-33.
Once triggered, the EPGA allows the exercise of truly awesome powers. The governor is empowered to issue any order “he or she considers necessary,” 
including limiting the movement of people in the affected area and their assembly in public, all public and private transportation, the sale of alcohol, and the 
storage or use of any material “deemed to be dangerous to public safety.”[18] The actions must only be “reasonable” and “necessary.”[19]
The legislature doubled down on this broad grant of power, explaining that the “legislative intent [was] to invest the governor with sufficiently broad power 
of action . . . to provide adequate control over persons and conditions during . . . disaster” and that courts should respect that goal.[20] All orders 
promulgated under the EPGA are effective for as long as the governor wishes.[21] Governor Whitmer’s April 1, 2020 emergency declaration relied on both 
the EMA and EPGA.[22]
c.     The Legal Challenge
Recognizing that the EMA required legislative approval for a longer order, Governor Whitmer requested an extension from the legislature. They partially 
complied, but only extended the order through April 30, 2020, allowing it to expire thereafter.[23] Governor Whitmer rescinded her legislatively extended 
orders on their expiration date, and then reissued identical orders on the same statutory grounds.[24] A sly move, but ultimately unsuccessful. 
Midwest Institute of Health and three other plaintiffs sued the governor in U.S. District Court over these reissued orders, arguing that they violated the EMA, 
and alternately that the EPGA was an unconstitutionally overbroad delegation of powers.[25] The District Court certified the core questions to the Michigan 
Supreme Court.[26]
Writing for the Court, Justice Markman held that the governor lacked authority to reissue identical orders under the EMA to sidestep the legislature’s decision 
and that the EPGA was unconstitutional in its entirety.[27] The EMA evaded constitutional scrutiny and the court focused on Governor Whitmer’s highly 
legalistic procedural move. The Court reasoned that,
To allow such a redeclaration would effectively render the 28-day limitation a nullity. . . . [W]hen the cited language is read in reasonable conjunction 
with the language imposing the 28-day limitation, it is clear that the Governor only possesses the authority or obligation to declare a state of 
emergency or state of disaster once and then must terminate that declaration after 28 days if the Legislature has not authorized an extension.[28]
This mechanism is not an unconstitutional interference with executive power because the powers exercised are delegated from the legislature.[29] The police 
power is a legislative, not an executive power,[30] and therefore any limits on the governor’s exercise of the delegated power is merely a temporal limit on 
their delegation, not an interference in intrinsic executive powers.[31]
The Court addressed several very close textual readings of the EPGA. The Legislature argued that language such as “within the state” and “affected area” 
implied that the emergency could not encompass the entire state but merely a subdivision of it,[32] an argument the court neatly dismissed with a dictionary 
and common sense.[33] Justice Viviano, in his partial concurrence, argued that the Court need not reach the constitutional question because the EPGA did 
not allow executive actions against a biohazard threat.[34] The majority graciously disagreed, holding that the phrase “public safety” was broad and 
certainly encompassed dangerous diseases.[35] 
Most courts employ a set of constitutional avoidance principles as a way to preserve the legislature’s work if a permissible reading of the text will do so.[36] 
However in this case, the legislative intent and textual meaning was so clear that the Court had no choice but to address the issue head on.[37] The 
Michigan Constitution explicitly divides the government into three branches and prohibits any one from exercising the powers of the other.[38] Legislative 
power is vested in the legislature.[39] Therefore, for the governor to exercise what is a legislative power—the police power—the delegation must include an 
“intelligible principle” to guide its exercise.[40] The greater the power delegated, the more specific guidance the legislature must provide.[41]
Yet the EPGA’s only guide is that the executive actions must be “reasonable” and “necessary.”[42] The statute otherwise allows the executive to declare an 
emergency for an unlimited amount of time. This provides no meaningful guidance or limitation on the governor, either in scope or time.[43] “There is, in 
other words, nothing within either the ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ standards that serves in any realistic way to transform an otherwise impermissible 
delegation of legislative power into a permissible delegation of executive power.”[44] Further, the provision is not severable because it provides the only 
authorization to executive action and its removal would make the EPGA a legislative command without the associated powers to act—an impossibility.[45]
In summary then, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that Governor Whitmer could not avoid the legislature’s limitations by clever substitution of one 
executive order for another under the EMA, and that the EPGA was unconstitutional. Her orders were thereby left without legal basis. 
III. KENTUCKY
Governor Andy Beshear declared an emergency in Kentucky earlier than Governor Whitmer did in Michigan. On March 6, 2020, he issued Executive 
Order 2020-215 declaring a state of emergency in the Commonwealth.[46] Dozens of orders limiting commerce, individual freedom, and movement 
followed, based on that original invocation of executive discretion.[47] The original underlying power is contained in KRS Section 39A—an amended 
version of Kentucky’s first emergency powers statute.[48] 
Three plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin Governor Beshear’s orders, and the Attorney General intervened alongside them.[49] The complaint alleged that: (1) the 
governor did not comply with Section 39A in issuing the orders, (2) that Section 39A was unconstitutional, (3) that the orders should have been promulgated 
as administrative regulations requiring compliance with the state administrative procedures provisions, and (4) that the orders violated the Kentucky 
Constitution’s prohibition on the exercise of “absolute and arbitrary power.”[50] 
a.     KRS Section 39A
KRS Section 39A is a frequently-invoked statute first passed in 1952[51] and amended in 1974 and 1998.[52] Its most current iteration allows the governor 
to respond to wide-ranging threats to the Commonwealth, including “biological and etiological hazards.”[53] The governor may act “[i]n the event of the 
occurrence or threatened or impending occurrence of any of the situations or events contemplated.”[54] The statute is most often invoked for local disasters 
like flooding and weather-related emergencies.[55] Unlike Michigan’s statute, there is no requirement for legislative approval beyond a certain date.
b.    Beshear v. Acree
The plaintiffs—several businesses affected by the COVID lockdown orders—argued that Governor Beshear failed to correctly invoke Section 39A and that 
the statute was unconstitutional in the first place.[56] A unanimous Court upheld the statute as constitutional and the governor’s exercise under it.[57]
The Attorney General argued that Governor Beshear’s orders could not lawfully come under Section 39A because he could not act unless the proposed 
emergency fell outside the capabilities of the local county emergency response agencies.[58] As the Court outlined, KRS 39A.100 authorized the governor 
to declare a state of emergency, and KRS 39A.010 lists the types of emergencies for which an emergency can be declared. But, the Attorney General 
argued, the definitions section in KRS 39A.020(12) defines an emergency as an “incident or situation . . . which a local emergency response agency 
determines is beyond its capabilities.”[59]
The court quickly brushed aside this objection. Holding that the connection between KRS 39A.100 and KRS 39A.010 was “essentially a straight line,”[60] 
they declined to apply the intervening definitions section as a “statutory detour.”[61] In support of this, they invoked Justice Scalia’s “elephants in 
mouseholes” canon,[62] reasoning that to allow the definitions section to apply to the whole statute would “alter the fundamental details” of the statute in 
impermissible ways.[63] As an alternate and substantially stronger justification, they claimed that to allow this definition to apply would “produce an absurd 
result.”[64] “The prospect that a Governor would need to consult with and defer to 120 different local agencies before he or she could declare a statewide 
emergency in the face of an immediate and fast-moving threat to the entire Commonwealth strains rational understanding.”[65]
Dispensing with the improper invocation claim, the Court moved on to the constitutionality of Section 39A as a whole. Ky. Const. § 27 establishes the three 
branches of government, while the subsequent section “prohibits any one branch from exercising any power properly belonging to either of the others, 
except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.”[66] Plaintiffs argued that the power involved was legislative, had been delegated 
without sufficient guidance by the legislature, and therefore violated § 27 of the Kentucky Constitution. 
The Court ultimately decided that the powers being exercised were actually not legislative at all,[67] and insofar as they were properly delegated.[68] In 
support of this, the Court looked to two provisions in the Constitution: the powers of the governor, and the part-time legislature and the governor’s authority 
to call it into special session. Both are distinct but play off each other to give the impression of an “implied tilt . . . toward executive powers.”[69] Because 
the executive is the commander-in-chief of the state’s military units, such as they are, and is subject to the “take care” mandate but only permitted to call the 
part-time legislature into special session, he by implication has broader powers than would otherwise be assumed.[70] A part-time legislature is supposedly 
unable to respond quickly when called into session and therefore more power must necessarily devolve on the governor. To look deeper, the Court says, 
would be inappropriate and impractical in the face of an emergency.[71]
Even if the powers involved had been legislative, the court declined to “revive” Kentucky’s separation-of-powers doctrine.[72] The 1890 Constitution 
contains strong language prohibiting the exercise of the powers of one branch by another branch,[73] giving rise to one of the strongest separation-of-
powers doctrines of any state.[74] The U.S. Supreme Court requires an “intelligible principle” for a Congressional delegation of power to pass muster[75] 
and Kentucky courts generally require the same, though the Court downplayed the usefulness of the standard in its opinion.[76] 
The Kentucky Supreme Court found the term “necessary” sufficient guidance for the executive, unlike Michigan. Because Kentucky’s “Governor does not 
have emergency powers of indefinite duration,” the legislature is part-time, and the scope of emergencies is so broad, a simple “standard[] of protection of 
life, property, peace, health, safety and welfare” is sufficient.[77] Essentially, because the Constitution keeps the legislature from addressing sudden 
problems, the governor must have the power to do so.[78] “In sum, the powers exercised by a Kentucky Governor in an emergency are likely executive 
powers in the first instance . . . but to the extent those powers are seen as impinging on the legislative domain, our General Assembly has wisely addressed 
the situation in KRS Chapter 39A.”[79]
IV. ANALYSIS
We are left then with two states in the same Federal Circuit whose Supreme Courts arrived at opposite conclusions on similar executive orders, enabling 
statutes, and constitutional provisions—dealing with the same biological hazard. Both state constitutions clearly lay out the provinces of each governmental 
branch[80] and prohibit one impinging on or exercising the powers of the other.[81] Both governors issued far-reaching orders under similar emergency 
powers statutes duly passed by their respective state legislatures. Yet when citizens challenged the orders in court, one was upheld and the other struck 
down.
Michigan’s high court not only held that Whitmer violated the EMA, but that the EPGA was an unconstitutional delegation of powers. Kentucky’s supreme 
court held that the governor’s orders were allowed under KRS Section 39A, and that Section 39A itself did not violate Kentucky’s nondelegation doctrine. 
How did we get such different results? The answer lies in the state-by-state differences allowed under our federal structure.
The largest structural difference between the two states lies in the composition of their legislatures. Michigan’s legislature is a full-time body, while Kentucky’s 
is strictly limited to 60-day sessions every other year with 30-day sessions in between.[82] This most certainly influenced the Kentucky court. As Michigan’s 
Justice Markman pointed out, the broader the scope and time of executive power, the more guidance and limitation the legislature must provide on its 
delegated power.[83] Michigan’s legislature, meeting far more often, could more easily act on an executive order. Kentucky’s is powerless to act, and the 
governor’s power to call a special session is permissive, not prescriptive.[84] Though it could certainly be read the opposite way, the courts felt that this 
required more justification for the Michigan statute and less for Kentucky’s. Kentucky’s court appeared extremely concerned that a threat to the 
Commonwealth be unaddressed by any branch at all, at least at the state level.[85] Showing extreme deference to the executive, the court read the 
nondelegation doctrine narrowly and the guiding principles broadly to arrive at the result.[86] Kentucky’s court may also have been unwilling to require the 
governor to make a discretionary action—that of calling the legislature into special session. This is understandable. Courts should always be cautious in 
requiring the exercise of discretionary power, as it is by nature an infringement on that discretion. However, the court erred in assuming that the power to 
address the threat had to reside somewhere convenient. It should not be assumed that every legislative power unable to be exercised because the legislature 
is adjourned therefore devolves upon the governor for exercise until they reconvene. Indeed, the Court would doubtless agree. But it can be a fine line 
between assenting to that proposition in theory and disagreeing in practice. If the Court had struck down Section 39A as unconstitutional, the governor 
would still be within his powers to call the legislature into special session to grant him the necessary powers or simply allow them to act on their own accord. 
Kentucky deemed its governor’s powers to be executive in nature, whereas Michigan found them inherently legislative, perhaps the central difference 
between the two decisions. This distinction allowed the Kentucky Supreme Court to largely sidestep the nondelegation question in any detail, but that issue 
should not be dismissed so easily. Governor Beshear has consistently relied on his inherent executive power as justification for his actions, even invoking the 
seemingly irrelevant commander-in-chief power in the process.[87] While these powers are real and important, they do not automatically include the power 
to limit or even prohibit the exercise of citizen’s civil liberties. 
That power must be delegated or attained elsewhere. As prior decisions show, the police power is legislative, not executive, precedent the court largely 
ignored in its opinion.[88] Therefore, Section 39A must have been the delegation of legislative power to the executive for exercise, triggering nondelegation 
doctrine scrutiny, an historically high bar in Kentucky. As the Attorney General pointed out, “[t]he police power is possessed by the sovereignty, and in 
Kentucky, the sovereignty of the people is expressed by the General Assembly” because they are elected by the ultimate sovereigns—the people themselves.
[89] If this degree of power is inherently possessed by the executive, then he possesses sovereign power, an idea intrinsically antithetical to a republican 
system of government.[90] Additionally, if the power is inherent in a sovereign executive, then one wonders why Section 39A was ever necessary.[91]
Yet the court may have considered this the lesser of two evils. If the governor’s power was delegated from the people through the legislature, then Section 
39A would have been forced to run the gauntlet of Kentucky’s “double-barreled” nondelegation doctrine.[92] While watered down significantly since the 
early 20th century, Kentucky still possesses some of the strongest protections in the Union.[93] As a safeguard for the people, a statute must provide 
sufficient standards to protect against the inherent danger of combined legislative and executive power.[94] The Attorney General wanted the Court to 
abandon its gradual loosening of those protections, grounded in a pragmatic evaluation of the “pressures and practicabilities” of modern life, and return to 
the original doctrine.[95] Faced with the choice of justifying its doctrinal change on nondelegation, abandoning recent precedent to reverse the doctrinal 
change, or sidestepping the Attorney General’s question altogether, the Court apparently chose the latter. 
V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 respiratory virus spread swiftly across the United States and the entire globe in the first half of 2020. That spread necessitated swift and 
unprecedented action by governors, mayors, and officials on all levels of government. Now, as the dust begins to settle and we pick up the pieces, we 
should thoroughly evaluate what we have been through. Legislatures in particular must closely study the vigorous exercise of massive executive emergency 
powers and decide if these delegations were successful, legal, and desirable. 
Legislatures create statutes for the future, crafting them as best they can to address unforeseen and unpredictable exigencies. Some mistakes are inevitable. 
But COVID-19 provided a test of our civic resolve and legal foundations like few others in our history, and the future these statutes were created for is now in 
the past. We now have an excellent picture of the current state of our constitutions and cherished legal protections as interpreted by state supreme courts. 
Going forward, citizens in each state must ask themselves whether the results were satisfactory and examine what changes must be made to ensure future 
trials find us true to the principles that make us free.
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[92] See Legis. Rsch. Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Ky. 1984) (“[O]ur constitution has a double-barreled, positive-negative approach [to 
separation of powers].”).
[93] See Bd. of Trs. of Jud. Form Ret. Sys. v. Att'y Gen. of Com., 132 S.W.3d 770, 782 (Ky. 2003) (“Indeed, in the area of nondelegation, Kentucky may be 
unsurpassed by any state in the Union.”).
[94] See The Federalist No. 47, at 251 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McLellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001) (“When the legislative and 
executive powers are united in the same person or body . . . there can be no liberty.” (quotations omitted)). 
[95] Reply Brief for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, supra note 56, at 4.
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